
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5. (S) RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO SUGGESTS THAT SASSOU MIGHT WELL FEEL THE NEED TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF A BATTALION HE CONSIDERS TO BE POLITICALLY RELIABLE BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF MEMBERS OF HIS OWN ETHNIC GROUP, THESE DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING. IN SEPTEMBER 1990, THE LABOR UNIONS SUCCESSFULLY INITIATED A CHALLENGE TO THE RIGHT OF THE CONGOLESE LABOR PARTY TO APPOINT UNION LEADERS. IN OCTOBER 1990, THE UNIONS LAUNCHED A GENERAL STRIKE WHICH WAS WIDELY SUPPORTED BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND IN SOME CASES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL AS WELL, DURING THIS SAME PERIOD SENIOR MILITARY PERSONNEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY SUPPORTED THE MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE POLIT ICAL OFFICERS, SASSOU'S MOST LOYAL SUPPORTERS IN THE MILITARY, WERE ELIMINATED IN THE MILITARY. BY DECEMBER 1990, SASSOU NO LONGER HAD ENOUGH SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY OR THE GOVERNMENT TO EFFECT THE PROMOTION OF THREE OF HIS LOYALISTS TO THE RANK OF BRIGADIER GENERAL. IN A HEAD TO HEAD CONFRONTATION WITH THE NEW PRIME MINISTER, SASSOU FAILED IN HIS EFFORTS TO HAVE ONE OF HIS MOST LOYAL SUPPORTERS BRIGADIER GENERAL NORBERT ((DABIRA)) APPOINTED AS THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE. EVEN THE VISIT OF NELSON ((MANDELA)) TO THE CONGO, WHICH SASSOU HOPED TO USE TO BOLSTER HIS POSITION, BACKFIRED. DURING AN AUTO TOUR OF BRAZZAVILLE BY MANDELA AND SASSOU, MANY CONGOLESE ALONG THE WAY MADE A SOPHISTICATED DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS. THEY SHOUTED "LONG LIVE MANDELA AND SASSOU IS A THIEF." GIVEN ALL THE ABOVE, IF SASSOU IS ATTEMPTING TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BATTALION, HE IS NOT BEING PARANOID.

(6)(3)(10 USC 494

(5)(3):10 USC 424